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#2A-5/6/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WEST SENECA, 
Respondent, 
— — ^and- CASFlJOT U^8019 
WEST SENECA BLUE COLLAR UNIT, 
LOCAL 815, CSEA. INC., LOCAL 1000. 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
WESTON, KANE & MOEN. P.C. (TIMOTHY J. KANE, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (STEPHEN J. WILEY. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of 
West Seneca (Town) to the decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) that it violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the 
Taylor Law by reason of transferring unit work to nonunit 
employees. 
FACTS 
The West Seneca Blue Collar Unit. Local 815, CSEA, Inc.. 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) represents a unit of 94 
full-time, blue-collar employees of the Town, some of whom 
Board - U-8019 -2 
work in the highway and sanitation departments. The 
sanitation department work is lower paid. New employees are 
hired as sanitation laborers and, as vacancies occur, they 
are moved to highway laborer positions. 
Fo_r__several years before the- filing of the charge the 
Town hired seasonal employees, mostly students, for the 
period of late May through the end of August. By agreement 
between the Town and CSEA these seasonal employees were not 
in the negotiating unit. They were paid less than unit 
employees and were assigned sanitation department work to 
cover for unit employees who were on vacation or for those 
sanitation men who were covering for vacationing highway 
department personnel. 
On December 17. 1984, the Town hired 12 seasonal 
laborers in the sanitation department to work from January 21 
to May 31, 1985. These seasonal laborers were paid more than 
the summer seasonals, but less than unit employees. 
Subseguently, the new seasonal employees were assigned 
highway department work and, on May 30, 1985, some of them 
were rehired for a new season. 
The status of the new seasonal employees was raised in 
negotiations between the Town and CSEA. The Town explained 
that they were needed because the number of laborers in the 
highway and sanitation departments had dropped in the past 
and the remaining employees were not sufficient to perform 
the work of the departments. It noted that no unit employees 
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had lost their positions as a result of the hiring of any 
seasonal employees. The parties' negotiations broke down 
when an impasse was reached over CSEA's demand and the Town's 
refusal to include the new seasonal employees in the 
-negotiating unit. 
DISCUSSION 
The Town makes four arguments in support of its 
exceptions: 
1. It did not assign unit work to nonunit employees 
because the work of the laborers had never been reserved to 
unit employees. 
2. The exclusion of seasonal workers from the unit was 
bilateral and not unilateral. 
3. It had not refused to negotiate with respect to its 
employment of the new seasonal employees. Hence, their 
employment could not violate §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. 
4. Its decision to employ the new seasonal employees 
was not motivated by a design to interfere with, restrain or 
coerce the unit employees in the exercise of rights protected 
by the Taylor Law. Hence, it could not have violated 
§209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments 
of the parties, we conclude that the Town violated 
§209-a.l(d), but not §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. 
1S34! 2 
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There was a past practice of hiring nonunit seasonal 
employees to perform laborer work, but before December 1984, 
that practice was clearly circumscribed. It was limited to 
the summer vacation period and thus facilitated vacations by 
unit employees . - Furthermore, ij; was limited_t.o_._the_ 
sanitation department, which permitted unit employees in that 
department to work temporarily in the highway department for 
higher wages. In all other respects, unit employees 
exclusively performed unit work.— 
The actions of the Town complained of in the charge 
broke the perimeter of the past practice. It was improper 
for the Town to do so unilaterally. It is irrelevant that no 
unit employees were laid off. A public employer may not 
assign tasks of unit employees to nonunit employees unless 
the tasks or the qualifications for the job have been 
2/ 
substantially changed.— 
A/ln 1972 and 1973, there were CETA employees working for 
the Town. The record does not indicate the duties of the CETA 
employees or whether they were in the negotiating unit. 
^Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB 
1.3083 (1985). No claim is made by the Town that any of the 
tasks or qualifications for the unit positions have been 
significantly altered. Although no employees were laid off as 
a result of the assignments, this was so only because the Town 
first permitted the number of unit employees to decrease 
through attrition and then replaced the lost employees by 
seasonals. 
1 
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The Town's arguments regarding the §209-a.l(d) violation 
also are not persuasive. While there had been some 
negotiations with respect to the unit work issue, these 
negotiations had not been exhausted and the City was 
3/ 
therefore prohibited from actl-n-q--u-njL4jate;ral-l:Y-.^ -^ --TJie___ 
City's argument that seasonal employees were bilaterally 
excluded from the negotiating unit is irrelevant. The 
violation found by the ALJ was not that the Town hired 
nonunit seasonal employees, but that it improperly assigned 
unit work to them. 
Although the conduct of the Town violates §209-a.l(d) of 
the Taylor Law, there is no evidence that it also constitutes 
a violation of §209-a.l(a). The ALJ cites our decision in 
East Rockaway UFSD, 18 PERB ir3069 (1985). in support of her 
finding of such a violation. In that case, an ALJ had 
dismissed a charge alleging a violation of §209-a.l(a) in 
that the employer had created a new nonunit position, the 
duties of which were identical with those of an eliminated 
unit position. We found that the ALJ erred in not permitting 
further inquiry because, if not explained, the conduct of the 
employer would be a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor 
Law. Here, however, a hearing has been held and the record 
1/For an example of circumstances under which a 
public employer may act unilaterally, even though 
negotiations have not been exhausted, see Wappinqer CSD, 
5 PERB ir3074 (1972), and Cohoes CSD. 12 PERB 1f3113 (1979). 
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is complete. On that record we find that the Town has a 
claim of right which, albeit not sufficient to justify its 
conduct, is sufficient to negate the proposition that its 
action was improperly motivated. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Town to _^ 
1. Cease and desist from assigning unit work to nonunit 
personnel other than summer seasonals who work in the 
sanitation department. 
2. Restore to the unit that work assigned to nonunit 
personnel other than summer seasonals who work in the 
sanitation department. 
3. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA concerning the 
terms and conditions of employment of unit employees. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: May 6, 1986 
Albany, New York 
<Ss-^>£-JZ^ PC WU^s-*-+<S-t>K-£Z-^L-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
~*e. 
Waiter L . E i senberg , Member 
V 
jL%Jf 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
aUBUC=EM|5UOYMENT=RELATIOMS^BOARa 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of West Seneca in the 
unit represented by the West Seneca Blue Collar Unit, Local 815, 
CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the Town of West 
Seneca 
1) Will not assign unit work to nonunit personnel other 
than summer seasonals who work in the sanitation 
department. 
2) Will restore to the unit that work assigned to 
nonunit personnel other than summer seasonals who 
work in the sanitation department. 
3) Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA concerning 
the terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees. 
Town of West Seneca 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2B-5/6/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK AT BINGHAMTON). 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-809 6 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC., 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ. (RICHARD J. DAUTNER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (WILLIAM M. WALLENS. 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge 
against the State of New York (State University of New York 
at Binghamton) (State). The charge alleges that the State 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by unilaterally 
imposing a vehicle registration fee at the Binghamton campus 
of the State University. 
The record shows that on April 1, 1985, the State 
unilaterally imposed a $3.00 registration fee upon all 
10347 
Board - U-8096 -2 
vehicles that regularly use the SUNY Binghamton campus. It 
further shows that approximately 12,000 people are subject to 
the registration fee, of whom about 650 are represented by 
CSEA, 9.500 are not employed by the State, and the remaining 
affected persons are employees who are not represented by 
CSEA. 
The sole issue is whether the action taken by the State 
involved a mandatory subject of negotiation which was 
therefore beyond its authority to take unilaterally. CSEA 
relies upon State of New York, 6 PERB 1P005 (1973). It holds 
that free parking for public employees is a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, and, therefore, that the unilateral 
imposition of parking fees at work locations where employees 
had previously enjoyed free parking privileges was a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. CSEA also relies 
upon City of New York. 9 PERB 1P076 (1976) which holds that 
the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by 
unilaterally withdrawing a benefit enjoyed by unit 
employees -- riding City-owned ferries without charge even 
though the general public had to pay for such rides. 
CSEA's position is based upon a misconstruction of the 
two cases. CSEA interprets the State of New York case as 
standing for the proposition that parking fees are per se a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. The holding of that case, 
however, is that parking fees which are uniguely applicable 
to public employees are a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Board - U-8096 -3 
The reason for this is that the fees affect both the 
compensation of the employees, certainly a term of 
employment, and parking opportunities, a fringe benefit of 
employment. Where, however, a public employer operates 
parking lots that are used by the public in general, and only 
incidentally by public employees, the holding would be 
otherwise. 
This distinction was noted by the ALJ in his reliance 
upon another State of New York case, 13 PERB 1f3099 (1980). 
There, we held that the imposition of an application fee for 
nonpromotional Civil Service examinations was not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation, saying (at p. 3159): 
The action of the State may be analogized to that 
of a government that maintains a bridge, the use 
of which has been toll-free. If that government 
decided to impose a toll for the use of the 
bridge, its employees, as well as other 
constituents, would be affected. The same would 
be true thereafter if the government decided to 
increase the toll. Notwithstanding the financial 
impact of such action upon the government's 
employees, there would be no duty to negotiate 
with the union representing its employees before 
imposing or raising the tolls. 
The City of New York decision relied upon by CSEA deals 
with a different situation. Although there was a charge for 
use of ferries imposed upon the public at large, there had 
been a past practice of exempting unit employees from that 
charge. The change in the past practice did not affect the 
public at large, but only the unit employees. As such, 
because its application was uniquely applicable to those 
employees, it involved a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Board - U-8096 
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Here, the action of the State was designed to and does 
affect a universe of which CSEA-represented employees 
constitute less than 6% of the whole. As found by the ALJ, 
"It applies to the public at large in the same manner as it 
applies to unit employees, and is totally unrelated to 
employment status." We conclude, therefore, that it does not 
involve a mandatory subject of negotiation. However, as 
noted by the ALJ and recognized in the State's memorandum of 
law, a different conclusion would be required if the unique 
status of the unit employees were involved, for example, if 
CSEA demanded to negotiate an exemption from the fee. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 6. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memoer 
*1C350 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE-NOv U-8 347^  
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on what purports to be an appeal 
by Thomas C. Barry from interlocutory rulings of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The rulings complained about 
relate to a letter he wrote to the ALJ on April 9, 1986, 
conditionally agreeing to hearing dates. The conditions were: 
1. That I be allowed to amend the I.P. to 
reflect Hudson. 
2. That the ALJ undertake to provide 
assurances that following the hearing she 
would treat the I.P. with the greatest 
expedition.1/ 
i/ln an earlier letter to the ALJ, which Barry has 
attached to his purported appeal, he wrote: 
You, . . ., will produce your decision in this 
matter within thirty days of the hearings, say 
by 15 June, and will urge the Bd., either in 
the body of that decision, or in a letter 
attachment, to give this decision its first 
priority for attention, as I will likewise do 
on my appeals papers. 
Board - U-8347 -2 
The ALJ did not rule on Barry's request to amend his 
charge, but she expressly rejected his second condition for 
agreeing to the hearing dates on the ground that he was 
attempting to dictate the procedures that should be followed 
by the ALJ . ___^_„ •_ 
A party has no right to appeal from an interlocutory 
ruling of an ALJ but may request permission to do so pursuant 
to §204.7(h) of our Rules of Procedure. Assuming that 
Barry's "appeal" is a motion for permission to file 
exceptions to interlocutory rulings, we deny that motion on 
the ground that the rulings of the ALJ are proper and fully 
consistent with our Rules. As noted by the ALJ, Barry is 
attempting to dictate the procedures that should be followed 
2/ by the ALJ. He has no right to do so.— 
2/Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of New York (Behrens). 14 PERB 1P034 (1981). In a 
letter dated April 17, 1986, addressed to the ALJ and the 
attorney for United University Professions, Barry 
instructed them not to proceed with the processing of this 
matter because he had filed an appeal with this Board. 
Until a final decision is issued by the ALJ, it is she, and 
not a litigant, who determines the procedure that must be 
followed. The filing of a request for permission to file 
exceptions to interlocutory rulings does not alter this 
situation unless this Board grants such a motion and stays 
the proceeding before the ALJ. 
B352 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and 
3/ it hereby is, denied. 
DATED: May 6. 198 6 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memoer 
Awhile Barry has written to the ALJ "it is 
imperative that you now begin to settle this matter with 
great dispatch," he has indicated that he is prepared to 
participate in hearings only if conditions which he sets 
are accepted. He may not impose such conditions. The ALJ 
should set reasonable dates for hearings and should proceed 
at that time. She should dismiss the charge for failure to 
prosecute if Barry does not participate because his 
conditions have not been met. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRIGHTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
^^ and^  " — CASE NO. U-^8482 
BRIGHTON TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO. LOCAL #3889, 
Charging Party. 
ROBERT SWAYZE, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Brighton Transportation Association, NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Local #3889 (Association) to the decision of the Director 
dismissing its charge against the Brighton Central School 
District (District). 
The charge contains two specifications. One is that the 
District refused to negotiate its decision to subcontract bus 
services to a private company called Golden Arrow. The other 
is that notwithstanding the promise of the District that 
Golden Arrow would employ all the District's bus drivers. 
Golden Arrow refused to employ Bruce Crance, a District bus 
10354 
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driver for seventeen years.-
The Director dismissed the charge on the ground that it 
is not timely.-
The charge alleges that the District decided to 
subcontract its transportation system on April 1, 1985 and 
that the parties commenced bargaining on that decision two 
weeks later. It further recites that on April 22, 1985, the 
District announced that it was subcontracting its 
transportation system to Golden Arrow. Nevertheless, as 
stated in the charge, when negotiations reached an impasse, 
the dispute was submitted first to mediation and then to fact 
finding. Finally, the charge alleges that on or about 
i/The charge implies, but does not allege, that 
Crance was not employed by Golden Arrow because he had 
engaged in conduct protected by the Taylor Law. The charge 
states that Crance had been employed by the District as a 
bus driver for over seventeen years, that he had filed many 
grievances against the District and had been involved in 
several improper practice charges against it, that the 
District stated that it structured the subcontracting bids 
in such a way to guarantee all current bus drivers with job 
offers from the subcontractor, and that the subcontractor 
refused to offer Crance a job. 
2/Section 204.1(a) of the PERB's Rules of Procedure 
requires that the charge be filed "within four months" of 
the act claimed to be violative of the Taylor Law. 
The Director also dismissed the specification of the 
charge alleging that Crance was not hired by Golden Arrow, 
on the ground that it merely complained about the conduct 
of a private sector entity which is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Board, there being no allegation of 
any exercise of improper influence over Golden Arrow by the 
) District. Inasmuch as we affirm the decision of the 
Director that the charge was not timely, we do not reach 
this question. 
10355 
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July 15. 1985. the District announced that it would 
subcontract its bus system regardless of what a fact finder 
might recommend. All of these events occurred more than four 
months prior to the filing of the charge. 
The only event relating to the negotiations which 
occurredwithin the fouif monthT^tin^ frame covered by the 
charge was the District's rejection of a fact finder's 
recommendation on August 27, 1985. That, by itself, could 
not constitute a violation of a District's duty to negotiate 
in good faith. While the other allegations in the charge 
might be read as background information designed to show that 
rejection of the fact finder's report was improperly 
motivated and. therefore, a violation of the District's duty 
to negotiate in good faith, we do not read the charge in this 
way. The Association's exceptions show that it focused on 
the statement that the District would not accept a fact 
finder's report which did not endorse its position, the 
actual rejection merely being corroboratory. In any event, 
there is little reason to confront the issue of whether the 
District violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by 
subcontracting its transportation service in this charge. 
The issue has already been raised in a timely charge filed by 
3/ the Association.— 
^Brighton CSD. U-8102. It was withdrawn two weeks ago. 
See UFT (Barnett). 17 PERB 1P113 (1984). in which we stated 
that a charge may be dismissed because it was so closely 
related to a prior charge by the same party that it was 
subsumed by that charge. 
10356 
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With respect to the specificatioris'that Crance was not 
hired by Golden Arrow, the charge shows that he was informed 
of his rejection on July 31, 1985. The Association argues 
that the time to file the charge should run from the time of 
opening school in September^ l:9jB15^ becauseL^ that is when^Cr ance— 
first actually suffered the consequences of not being hired. 
We reject this argument. The time to file a charge runs from 
the date when a party becomes or should have become aware of 
the conduct which allegedly constitutes the violation.— 
The Association also argues that its time to file a 
charge was extended because Crance asked Golden Arrow on 
August 27, 1985, why he was not being rehired. According to 
the Association, Crance was invited to submit his inquiry in 
writing and he did so on September 5, 1985, but he never 
received a reply. These events did not extend the 
Association's time to file the charge. Whether Golden Arrow 
was or was not willing to explain why Crance had not been 
hired is irrelevant. The decision not to rehire him had been 
communicated to him on July 31, 1985, and was not 
1/city of Yonkers. 7 PERB 1P007 (1974); County of 
Cattaraugus, 8 PERB 1P062 (1975). 
10357 
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5/ being reconsidered. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Director 
and WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 6. 1986 
Albany, New York 
^r^ss^^^?, ^cc tCc^^i^a^t^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membyer bjer 
5./Compare. Board of Fire Commissioners, Brighton Fire 
District, 10 PERB V3091 (1977). In any event, we note that 
the allegation that the reason Crance was not hired by 
Golden Arrow was the District's desire to retaliate against 
him for the exercise of protected activities is a subject 
of another charge which was also withdrawn two weeks ago, 
Brighton CSD, U-8119. 
m 51 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALL PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS BENEFITING 
UNDER SECTION 208.3 OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE LAW. 
Respondents, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8673 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS C. BARRY. ££0. se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Thomas C. 
Barry to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his charge 
against "All Public Employee Unions Benefiting Under Section 
208.3 of the Civil Service Law." The charge alleges that: 
none or practically none of the public employee 
trade unions presently receiving benefits under 
sec. 208.3 of the CSL ("agency fees") conform to 
and comply with the ruling contained in the 
decision of the US Supreme Ct. in Hudson 
(19 PERB sec. 7502) 
Barry then states that, as a remedy, this Board should notify 
all such unions of their obligations under the Supreme Court 
decision and should investigate compliance with that decision. 
Board - U-8673 -2 
The Director dismissed the charge on the ground that 
Barry has no standing to file a charge complaining about the 
agency shop fee procedures followed by public employee 
organizations other than the one which represents him because 
no other emp 1 oyee orqanization oweLS jiim ajiy_statutors duty in 
this regard. The Director also noted that this Board has no 
general investigatory responsibilities. 
We affirm the decision of the Director for the reasons 
stated therein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 6, 198 6 
Albany, New York 
^^^^^^/U,/^-^ jZytS-J*"- £&<<_ 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Cha i rman 
-c— <^ _ 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Membe 
#2F-5/6/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY. 
Employer/Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2944 
SCHENECTADY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
BUCHYN. O'HARE & WERNER, ESQS. (DOMINIQUE POLLARA, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Employer/Petitioner 
GRASSO AND GRASSO, ESQS. (JANE K. FININ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Schenectady to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
the petition of the City to remove captains and lieutenants 
from a long-standing negotiating unit which includes 
patrolmen, officers, investigators and sergeants.- The 
i^The petition also sought the exclusion of sergeants . 
from that negotiating unit. The City has not filed 
exceptions to that part of the Director's decision which 
determined that sergeants should be left in the unit. In a 
related case, the Director dismissed an application of the 
City for the designation of captains, lieutenants and 
sergeants as managerial employees. The two cases had been 
consolidated by the Director for decision. There are no 
exceptions to the dismissal of the application. 
0361 
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petition and exceptions are opposed by the Schenectady 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA). 
The table of organization of the City's police department 
shows one chief and two assistant chiefs, all of whom are 
managerial employees; four..captain positions,. one of which is 
vacant; four lieutenants; twenty sergeant positions with one 
additional sergeant assigned; ninety-one patrol officers and 
twenty-two investigators. The positions of captain, lieutenant, 
sergeant, patrol officer and investigator have been in a single 
unit since 1967. 
The legal issues are framed by County of Ulster. 16 PERB 
1f3069 (1983) and to a lesser extent by Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of Buffalo, 14 PERB 1f305l 
(1981). In Buffalo, this Board held that cook-managers who 
perform supervisory functions should not be removed from a 
long-standing unit of rank-and-file employees. The opinion 
states that there is an a priori assumption that a conflict of 
interest exists between rank-and-file employees and supervisors 
but that in the particular instance, the assumption was overcome 
by evidence to the contrary. We found that no party had 
presented any evidence or argument in support of the proposition 
that the City was suffering any administrative inconvenience by 
reason of the existing unit. In this connection, we noted that a 
major indication of administrative inconvenience would be a 
showing that effective supervision by the supervisors was being 
subverted by reason of the unit structure. 
10362 
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County of Ulster narrowed our decision in Village of 
Scarsdale, 15 PERB 1f3125 (1982), which had placed greater 
emphasis on the subversion of supervision test. Ulster held 
that proof of actual subversion of supervisory responsibilities 
is not required in_ order—to. est^^ablish^ a^aasis—f ox^xemoving 
supervisory employees from a rank-and-file unit on the ground 
of administrative convenience. It indicated that such 
administrative convenience could be established in the absence 
of actual proof of subversion of supervision, based upon the 
following factors: 
the level of supervisory functions of the 
employees involved, the nature and size of the 
x existing and proposed units, the nature of the 
service performed by the employees involved and 
any special working relationship between them. 
The most effective argument of the City is that the chief 
and assistant chiefs work the same 40-hour week, which means 
that the subordinate officers control the department 128 out of 
168 hours a week. 
In response, the PBA contends that there is no evidence 
that the officers perform functions which have been held to 
constitute high level supervision. Specifically, it argues 
that there is no evidence that officers: 1) assign work and 
overtime, 2) prepare work schedules, 3) interview prospective 
employees and make effective recommendations for hiring, 
4) make effective recommendations for promotions, 5) evaluate 
) employees' job performances, 6) make effective recommendations 
for disciplinary action, and 7) receive and approve requests 
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for leave and sick time. It further argues that there is no 
evidence that captains or lieutenants are even engaged in: 1) 
direction of work assignments either at the police station or 
at crime scenes. 2) evaluation of probationary employees, 3) 
imposition of minor discipline and temporary transfer of 
personnel, and 4) supervision and assignment of extra training. 
Having reviewed the record, we find that the authority of 
the captains and lieutenants in running the department is 
severely limited, particularly in matters concerning labor 
relations. In matters other than labor relations, there is 
evidence that captains may take independent steps to meet 
emergency situations. Thus, during a strike at General 
Electric, a captain temporarily reorganized the department into 
two 12-hour shifts. This, however, was an unusual exercise of 
authority under unusual circumstances. 
As a general matter, captains and lieutenants investigate 
complaints of infractions by lower level staff. However, they 
issue charges only upon the approval of the chief. Those 
charges are signed by the captains who prefer them as well as 
by the chief or the mayor but recommendations by captains or 
lieutenants that charges be preferred are not accepted 
automatically. A captain or lieutenant may, however, suspend a 
subordinate temporarily, pending charges. 
Captains and lieutenants have no significant role in 
hiring and firing. They have little discretion in the granting 
of leave or time off, these matters being covered in detail by 
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the contract. There is, however, some discretion with respect 
to the granting of compensatory time off. The practice is for 
grievances to go directly to the chief. 
These facts do not indicate a high level of supervision 
such as would. require the partition of the long-standing unit. . 
As to the issue of PBA subversion of supervisory 
responsibility in the long-standing unit, the record shows that 
in one instance it brought charges against a captain who was 
then working as an acting assistant chief because it 
disapproved of some aspect of his conduct. This was not an 
attempt to subvert the supervisory authority of a unit employee. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director, 
and 
WE ORDER that the petition herein be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 6. 1986 
Albany. New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MOUNT MARKHAM TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION. 
Respondent, CASE NO. D-023 9 
up^r^the^Charge^of Violation of 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On April 3, 1986, Martin L. Barr, this agency's Counsel, 
filed a charge alleging that the Mount Markham Teachers' 
Association (Respondent) had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) 
§210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned 
and engaged in a 3-workday strike against the Mount Markham 
Central School District commencing February 7, 1986. 
The charge further alleged that of the 111 employees in 
the negotiating unit, 78 to 80 full and part-time employees 
participated in the strike. 
The Respondent requested Counsel to indicate the penalty 
he would be willing to recommend to this Board as appropriate 
for the violation charged. Counsel proposed a penalty of the 
loss of Respondent's right to have dues and agency shop fee 
deduction privileges to the extent of forty per cent (40%) of 
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the amount which would otherwise be deducted during a 
year— and agreed to recommend that this penalty not take 
effect sooner than September 1, 1986. Upon the understanding 
that Counsel would recommend and this Board would accept that 
penalty, the Respondent did not file an answer to the 
charge. Counsel has so recommended. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
Respondent violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike 
as charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is 
a reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction 
rights of the Mount Markham Teachers' Association be 
suspended, commencing on the first practicable date, but no 
sooner than September 1, 1986, and continuing for such period 
of time during which forty per cent (40%) of its annual 
agency shop fees, if any, and dues would otherwise be 
deducted. Thereafter, no dues or agency shop fees shall be 
deducted on its behalf by the Mount Markham Central School 
i/This is intended to be the equivalent of a 5-month 
suspension of privileges of dues and agency shop fee 
deductions, if any, if such were withheld in 12 monthly 
installments throughout the year. The School District 
advises that the annual dues are deducted during a period of 
less than 12 months, i.e., over 10 pay periods. 
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District until the Respondent affirms that it no longer 
asserts the right to strike against any government as 
required by the provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: May 6. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2H-5/6/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CATON, 
Employer, 
- ^and^ L—: CASE^NOT^^tm 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 529. 
Petitioner. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 16, 1985, the Teamsters Local Union No. 
529 (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely 
petition, seeking certification as the exclusive representa-
tive of certain full-time, blue-collar employees of the 
Town of Caton (employer) in the following unit: 
Included: Laborers, Truck Drivers. Equipment 
Operators and Mechanics 
Excluded: All guards, supervisory personnel, 
clericals and all other employees. 
Thereafter, a secret-ballot election was held 
pursuant to the consent agreement signed by the parties, at 
which all three ballots were cast against representation by 
the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that 
a majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast 
ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
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collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that 
the petition should be, and hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 6. 198 6 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memlper 
